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A B S T R A C T
Drawing on a survey of 800 business associations, the article
seeks to explain why interest groups lobby the EU insti-
tutions and what groups maintain contacts with them.
Rooted in organizational theory, it argues that four main
dimensions influence access patterns – institutional context,
resource dependencies, interest group organization, and
strategic choices. The empirical analysis demonstrates that
all dimensions are relevant. Nonetheless, contacts between
EU policy-makers and interest groups display only a few
general traits: they are shaped by the political mobilization
of groups in response to EU regulation, the division of
labour among EU and national associations and the import-
ance of organizational resources. Beyond these general
influences, the interactions vary profoundly in the
segmented institutional context.
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Introduction
Relations among European Union (EU) institutions and interest groups are a
major element in the governance of the EU. European Commission officials
discuss EU policies as frequently with interest organizations as with members
of the European Parliament (EP) or the Council of the EU (Hooghe, 2001: 64).
In fact, the EU bureaucrats are more often in touch only with national civil
servants than with business interest groups. Many scholars consider the access
of interest groups to the EU institutions to be important because systematic
variations in these access patterns can result in biased politics (Coen, 1998;
Cowles, 2001). It is therefore puzzling that comprehensive studies of these
interactions are rare (but see Beyers, 2002; Bouwen, 2002; Mahoney, 2004). EU
interest group studies tend to concentrate on EU interest organizations rather
than national groups, look into distinct issue areas and at specific EU insti-
tutions, analyse organizations from just one member state, or focus on the
domestic level in EU policy-making (Dür and De Bièvre, 2007; Eising, 2006;
Woll, 2006).
As a result, no coherent picture has yet emerged as to what determines
the access of interest groups to the EU institutions.1 Vivien Schmidt (1999)
highlights the importance of systemic factors, pointing especially to the mode
of interest intermediation that is prevalent in a political system. By contrast,
Gerda Falkner (2000) concentrates on sectoral characteristics. She maintains
that EU interest intermediation needs to be studied sector by sector. Finally,
Pieter Bouwen (2002) stresses the organizational features of interest groups,
particularly emphasizing their control of policy information.
Each of these studies has great merits in pointing out major elements of
the political exchanges in the EU. But none of them controls for the other
potentially important dimensions. Addressing this shortcoming, I seek to
integrate them in a consistent explanation of interest group access to the EU
institutions, thus aiming at the consolidation and, when necessary, modifi-
cation of our established understanding. Drawing on the organizational
theory of resource dependencies, I suggest that the EU institutional context,
the resource dependencies between state and business, as well as the interest
groups’ structures and strategies shape access to EU policy-makers. The
empirical evidence is based on a cross-sectoral survey of 800 German, UK,
French and EU business associations and thus covers an important portion
of the EU interest group population.
The principal conclusion is that all dimensions must be taken into
account. Focusing on just one of them leaves out important facets of the access
patterns. Moreover, I single out the general determinants of interest group
access in the EU. These are the division of labour among European and
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national associations; the organizational resources of interest groups; and
their political mobilization when they find the EU institutions to be import-
ant for the representation of their interests. The effects of all other factors vary
among the EU institutions because of the segmented institutional context.
These variations point to different consultation criteria of the EU institutions
and suggest that the bureaucratic rationality of the Commission diverges
significantly from the susceptibility of the Parliament to public debate. They
also indicate that domestic modes of interest intermediation are less import-
ant for obtaining access to EU policy-makers than has been suspected.
The article is structured as follows. First, I discuss the rationale for
studying the access of business interests to the EU institutions and argue that
institutional context, resource dependencies, organizational structures and
strategic choices shape access patterns. After presenting the data and testing
the hypotheses by means of ordered logit regressions, I provide the empiri-
cal results. The conclusion summarizes the main findings and discusses their
implications for the study of interest groups in the EU.
Towards an explanation of interest group access in the EU
I define access as the frequency of contacts between interest organizations and
EU institutions. These contacts range from informal bilateral meetings with
EU officials and politicians to institutionalized committee proceedings. This
definition emphasizes that the organizations actually acquire contacts and do
not just aspire to them or forgo their access opportunities. Obviously, this
access concept excludes indirect ways and means to exert influence on policy-
makers via the public or the media. Nonetheless, it is well suited to studying
the representation of interests by business, which is said to pursue insider
strategies and seek face-to-face negotiations with policy-makers (Walker,
1991; Wilson, 1973).
Business associations seek access for a variety of reasons. On the one
hand, they cannot be sure that the EU institutions anticipate their interests
when devising policy proposals so that, in order to secure a final policy
outcome, they need to inform the institutions about their policy preferences
and about the merits and drawbacks of alternative courses of action. On the
other hand, seeking to survive as organizations, EU lobbying may serve to
maintain or expand their membership and financial status, secure the
attention and support of EU policy-makers, or obtain a favourable public
opinion climate (see Lowery, 2007: 48).
However, having access does not imply that their contacts have an effect
on EU policies (Meynaud and Sidjanski, 1971: 465; Beyers, 2002). In fact, the
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more groups are present in the European policy space, the less likely it is that
any of them will have a significant impact on political outcomes. In crowded
policy arenas, policy-makers may be able to play off interest groups against
each another. More generally, EU policy-makers may prefer to decide against
business interests and rather pursue their own policy agenda. And, in those
cases in which they include business concerns in EU legislation, this may
simply be the result of convergent but independent policy preferences. In
some instances, they might even co-opt interest organizations in order to
pursue their own goals.
In short, access is not equal to influence. Nonetheless, many groups find
these contacts necessary in their efforts to have a say in EU policies, given that
these tend to require a lot of detailed policy input and are often the outcome
of lengthy debates between EU policy-makers, national administrations and
interest organizations. It is therefore hardly surprising that interest groups
complain when they are shut out from EU decision-making.2 More generally,
Edgar Grande (1996) suggests that the temporary closure of decision-making
processes can enable policy-makers in the EU to fence off interest group
demands. In sum, those organizations that are continuously in touch with EU
officials and politicians are better informed about EU policy-making and
better able to voice their general concerns and specific proposals than are
other groups. Therefore, studying access helps to identify important determi-
nants of the European political process and major characteristics of those
organizations that assume important positions in EU policy networks, in part
acting as gate-keepers to the EU institutions.
I argue political access results from the institutional context, resource
dependencies and associational structures and strategies.
The institutional context
The institutional context defines the opportunities for getting in touch with
EU decision-makers (Meynaud and Sidjanski, 1971: 468; Marks and McAdam,
1996; Pollack, 1997; Lowery, 2007). Notably, three elements of the EU insti-
tutional setting shape the access of interest groups: its segmentation into three
pillars, the allocation of powers to its institutions, and their vertical and
functional differentiation. Because the first pillar, the European Communities
(EC), encompasses the vast majority of the Union’s policies, my subsequent
analysis concentrates on this pillar. The focus is on legislative lobbying at EU
level. Legal strategies involving the European Court of Justice or activities in
the member states will not be considered in detail. Nor will access to the
Economic and Social Committee be analysed because it is of only marginal
importance for the representation of interests in the EU.
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In the EC pillar, the European Commission is considered to be the most
important contact partner of interest groups (Mazey and Richardson, 2002).
Its legal monopoly over policy initiation grants it a crucial role in agenda-
setting and policy formulation. Many interest groups emphasize the difficulty
of obtaining substantial modifications of a Commission proposal once it has
been presented to the Parliament and the EU Council (Meynaud and 
Sidjanski 1971: 465). As the ‘guardian of treaties’, the Commission also
monitors compliance with Community law. Even though the Commission
exerts its powers collectively, it is rarely approached as a collegiate body.
Rather, interest groups maintain relations with its Directorates-General, each
of which is responsible for specific policy areas.
Over time, the European Parliament has acquired substantial legislative
powers. Nonetheless, even today, it is often held to be less important to
interest groups than the Council or the Commission because its influence
varies greatly according to the issue and decision-making procedure at hand.
In general, the EP is considered to represent supranational interests in EU
policy-making. But, being elected by national voters, the members of the
European Parliament (MEPs) are more amenable than the Commission to
national interests and more open to diffuse interests, including those repre-
senting the environment, consumers or large groups such as the unemployed
and pensioners. In general, the heads of the Standing Committees and the
rapporteurs who are responsible for drafting the policy dossiers are the most
important addressees for interest group demands.
Owing to its decisive position, the EU Council would seem to be a highly
relevant contact for interest groups. The meetings of the Council of Ministers
are prepared by its administrative machinery, the Committee of Permanent
Representatives (Coreper) and the Council working groups, which are
composed, for the most part, of national experts. Given its relatively few
meetings and its composition of national delegates, the Council is rarely
lobbied in Brussels. Rather, domestic interest groups tend to address their
concerns to national government departments. Although the Council’s policy
positions evolve along national lines, in part as a consequence of pressure by
domestic interests, the Council is more removed from interest group pressure.
Not only does it comprise the heads of state and government, thus represent-
ing the general interest to a larger degree, but it also meets formally only once
every six months, lessening its impact on the minutiae of day-to-day politics
in the EU. Therefore, the analysis concentrates on the EU Council.
Given the differentiation within these institutions, it can be expected that
interest organizations have more frequent interactions at the working level
than with the political leaders, partly because European integration consists
largely of technical details (Mazey and Richardson, 2002: 136). The desk
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officers in the Commission, the Council working groups and also the parlia-
mentary committees are responsible for drafting policy proposals or sorting
out their details. Accordingly, the bureaucratic staff depend heavily on infor-
mation and support. In contrast, the Commissioners and the ministers usually
do not pay attention to every policy detail but focus on those aspects that are
contested or deemed to be crucial. As far as interest groups are concerned,
lobbying them aims either at establishing broad policy principles, raising the
stakes in favour of a specific policy alternative, or revising decisions that were
taken earlier in the policy process. Hence, less frequent access to these leaders
does not imply that these contacts are less important than those at the working
level.
The EU multi-level system offers multiple opportunities for interest
organizations to represent their interests: ‘interest groups at any territorial
level are free to lobby government at any number of levels’ (Constantelos,
1996: 30). However, it is unlikely that EU associations and domestic groups
will be evenly represented at each level of government. These organizations
are tied to their members and embedded in the context in which they
emerged. They depend on routine exchanges with their partners from whom
they extract resources (see Wilson, 1973). Hence, it can be expected that their
location in the multi-level institutional setting shapes their political activities.
EU business associations tend to organize member firms and associations that
are located within the EU member states. This is important to the EU insti-
tutions, which have repeatedly stated that they do not wish to negotiate
separately with a large number of domestic interest organizations. In contrast,
national associations organize members and represent their interests at the
domestic level. To them, EU-level activities are an additional task. Because
they must manage scarce resources, they tend to rely on EU associations for
the representation of their interests at the EU level (Bennett, 1997). Only if the
EU regulation has an important impact on their members, if their division of
labour with those EU associations that are supposed to represent them in EU
politics is unsatisfactory, or if the terms of EU policy implementation on
domestic grounds have to be worked out, will they extend their activities to
the EU level. Hence, EU associations have more contacts with EU institutions
than do national associations.
Hypothesis 1.1: EU associations have more frequent access than do national
associations.
Being embedded in domestic contexts, it is plausible that national modes
of interest intermediation have an impact on the access patterns of national
interest organizations. Even in the era of economic globalization, many
authors find that these factors do not simply fade away and are relatively
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stable over time (e.g. Hollingsworth and Boyer, 1997; Hall and Soskice, 2001;
Lehmbruch, 1991), so that they continue to explain the interaction among
national institutions and domestic interest organizations. I therefore now
discuss the national state–business relations that are prevalent in France, the
United Kingdom and Germany.
Time and again, France has been labelled étatiste (see Schmidt, 1999). A
high degree of centralization enables state actors in pursuit of the public good
to impose their decisions on private parties in a non-cooperative fashion.
Associations do not play a major role when policies are formulated even
though they may come back in when policies are implemented. The United
Kingdom is as centralized as France but it is not rooted in the same statist
tradition (Dyson, 1980). The UK government generally strives for consensus
with interest groups but has a strong capacity to exclude them from political
processes. Thus, being sometimes subject to stop–go consultation in the UK’s
pluralism, interest groups enjoy relatively good access to their government
(Cowles, 2001). In Germany, state powers are more dispersed and interlocked
than in France or the UK, so that German associations have more access
opportunities. In addition, state institutions have a distinct preference for
associational self-regulation. In Germany’s corporatism, a substantial number
of associations have developed negotiation capacities and co-regulatory skills.
They have routine access to the government and are regarded as legitimate
spokespeople for their domains (Streeck, 1999). Translating these patterns to
the EU level means:
Hypothesis 1.2: Corporatism supports better access to the EU institutions than
does pluralism, which leads to better access than does statism.
However, the relation among domestic modes of interest representation
and political activities in the EU is not yet well understood so that there are
two major contenders to Hypothesis 1.2. First, some authors argue that em-
beddedness in domestic policy networks is decisive for the adaptation of
national actors to the EU. On the one hand, those associations that enjoy excel-
lent access to domestic institutions might continue to rely on their established
national channels of communication and influence. On the other hand, those
associations that are excluded from domestic policy networks might seek
compensation at EU level (Beyers, 2002). Accordingly, the correlation between
national and EU-level contacts should be negative.
Second, Vivien Schmidt (1999) and Maria Green Cowles (2001) suggest
that the degree of fit between the EU and the national modes of interest inter-
mediation matters most. According to this logic, those associations that are
well acquainted with the EU mode adapt more easily to EU-level interest
representation than do groups that have been socialized in a different setting.
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Both authors find that pluralism prevails in the EU. Accordingly, associations
socialized in a pluralistic context should find it easier to extend their practices
to the EU level than associations with a corporatist or a statist background.
Resource dependencies
Contacts are rooted in resource dependencies between state institutions and
interest groups. Hence, access cannot be fully understood without an
exchange paradigm. On the one hand, Majone (1996) has pointed out that
business bears the costs or obtains the benefits of EU regulation provided by
the EU institutions. However, EU regulation needs to be apparent to the
interest organizations if it is to trigger efforts to access the EU institutions.
Therefore, I rely on the importance that associations ascribe to the EU insti-
tutions as an indicator of their perception of EU regulation. If the associations
or their members are exposed to a higher degree of EU regulation, they are
likely to attach greater relevance to the EU institutions for the representation
of their interests and undertake greater efforts to access them.
Hypothesis 2.1: The more relevant that associations find the EU institutions for
the representation of their interests, the more they tend to seek and have contacts
with the EU institutions.
On the other hand, EU regulation generates a huge demand for policy
information. Some authors claim that this information is the most important
currency in European governance (Bouwen, 2002; Crombez, 2002). Given their
limited resources, the EU institutions are in need of information that enables
them to devise policy proposals that solve the problems at hand, can be
administered in the member states and can win a sufficient majority among
EU legislators (Mazey and Richardson, 2002: 148; Meynaud and Sidjanski,
1971: 552). Obviously, they have recourse to several sources of information,
such as international organizations, member state administrations, think-
tanks, interest organizations and scientific experts. The incentives of actors to
withhold or manipulate information are reduced by this broad variety of
sources as well as by the fact that many of them are involved in a series of
policy games. Their reputations might suffer if they proved to be unreliable.
The policy information of business interests is deemed essential in the areas
of market integration and regulation, standard-setting and external
commercial policy. Here, business interests command specific and private
information about the likely economic and technical effects of EU
programmes, their repercussions on domestic law and the political responses
of their members.
Hypothesis 2.2: The more policy information associations can deliver, the better
is their access.
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EU institutions depend on interest groups not only for their information
but for a variety of further exchange goods. In that respect, the consent of
interest groups to EU policies and their ability to enhance the legitimacy of
these policies seem crucial. EU institutions need the consent of business
interest organizations if these are able to forestall an agreement at EU level
or impede its implementation. Here, I consider the impact of the structural
economic power of business on its ability to veto EU policies. Given the strong
focus of the EU on market-making and market-correcting policies, the inter-
nationalization and economic weight of business would seem to be as import-
ant as policy information. Internationalization increases the veto power of
business because producers operating in international markets can more
credibly threaten to shift investments than can producers that are nested in
domestic markets.
Hypothesis 2.3: A higher degree of internationalization increases the number of
contacts.
Economic weight, which indicates the number of employees that the
members of an association have, is a proxy for the relevance of these firms in
the economy. The greater the economic weight of firms, the greater are ‘the
public consequences of [their] discretionary decisions in the market’
(Lindblom, 1977: 171) and the more will political actors be interested in the
functioning of the economic domains that business associations represent.
Needless to say, economic clout, investment decisions and employment
effects cannot be invoked for each and every policy issue and their import-
ance varies across time (Vogel, 1987).
Hypothesis 2.4: Greater economic weight secures better access to EU policy-
makers.
In recent years, EU institutions have also come to stress the contribution
of civil society – in which the Commission counts business interest groups
– to the legitimacy of European governance. Membership density indicates
to what extent an association mobilizes its potential members. The more
potential members an association organizes, the more it can claim to be repre-
sentative of its domain. This should improve its access because it increases
the democratic legitimacy of EU policies (European Commission, 2002a).
Hypothesis 2.5: A higher membership density improves access to EU institutions.
The organization of business interest associations
Business interest associations define, aggregate and promote the political
interests of a distinct group of producers or employers (Schmitter and Streeck,
1981: 33). They exchange resources with their members and with state
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institutions to ensure their continuation and to enhance their autonomy
(Wilson, 1973). Their organizational structures contain the core answers to 
the questions of how to deal with the demands of their members and of state
institutions (Truman, [1951]1993: 113). Several interest group studies that 
are rooted in organizational theory (Grote and Lang, 2003; Knoke, 1990;
Schmitter and Streeck, 1981; Walker, 1991; Wilson, 1973) have highlighted the
relevance of two key elements in organizational structures: organizational
domains and organizational resources.
The organizational domain has a strong impact on the collective activity
of associations. Separating those ‘members and interests that are admitted
into the association, from others that are excluded’ (Schmitter and Streeck,
1981: 122), it delimits the sectoral scope of the association. The size of the
sector domain has two opposing effects on access to political institutions. A
broader sector domain tends to enhance the relevance of an association to
policy-makers but decreases its capacity for collective action. Ceteris paribus,
a narrow sub-sector domain is associated with a small number of policy issues
and members, which allows the association to pursue its members’ interests
vigorously without much need for internal compromise. However, although
its capacity for collective action may be high, an association with a narrow
domain may turn out to be irrelevant to policy-makers. In contrast, a broader
sector or cross-sector domain increases the number of members and policy
issues the association must cope with such that the increased heterogeneity
of member interests may render the definition of collective goals more diffi-
cult. Nonetheless, EU institutions have stated that they prefer to negotiate
with broad-based associations because this facilitates political reforms and
relieves them of the task of dealing with a vast array of narrow claims
(European Commission, 2002a).
Hypothesis 3.1: A broader sector domain improves access to EU institutions.
Furthermore, different actors may be eligible to join an association. To
some extent, the types of members indicate the position that interest organiz-
ations assume in the associational system. Associations with a direct member-
ship of entrepreneurs, business organizations and firms form the bottom
layer. They tend to have narrow domains and aggregate interests at a rela-
tively low level. By contrast, federations organize other associations and are
located at the higher echelons of the associational population, which should
improve their access to EU policy-makers. In addition, several business
associations allow for the membership of both firms and associations. Firms
thereby avoid the filtering of their interests in lower-order associations. In
turn, mixed membership groups obtain additional resources from the firms.
Therefore, they should have better access than federations.
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Hypothesis 3.2: Mixed membership groups have better access than federations,
and these have better access than direct membership groups.
To ensure their survival and maintenance, associations need a more or less
stable supply of resources from their members and their environment (Wilson,
1973: 30). Financial resources are a major prerequisite for their activities. A
larger income allows them to develop an elaborate division of labour, with a
permanent staff (Knoke, 1990: 76). Bureaucratization and specialization then
enable them to pursue their objectives more effectively. They also make for the
development of long-term goals, which can be conducive to the build-up of
continuous relations with state authorities.
Hypothesis 3.3: A larger budget improves access to the EU institutions.
To extract resources from their members, associations offer them in-
centives (Knoke, 1990; Schmitter and Streeck, 1981; Wilson, 1973). Business
associations usually provide some collective goods (i.e. they seek to affect
public policy-making or govern market exchanges) and some selective goods
(i.e. services) to their members. Hence, the main rationale of many business
interest groups is not interest representation but service provision. The repre-
sentation of interests may in fact be only a by-product of these other activi-
ties (Olson, 1965). However, empirical studies of EU interest groups suggest
that service provision is far less important than interest representation in EU
interest intermediation (Greenwood and Aspinwall, 1998). Hence, specializ-
ing in interest representation should equip groups with greater capacities to
access political institutions.
Hypothesis 3.4: Specialization in interest representation improves access to EU
institutions.
The strategic choices of interest organizations
Even though their activities are in part determined by their organizational
domain and by their resources, associations have some latitude left in the
choice of their strategy of interest representation. Here, many studies
distinguish between insider and outsider strategies (Walker, 1991). However,
the empirical analysis indicates that business associations rely on three
strategies to represent their interests in the EU: to different degrees, they
pursue insider, outsider and nationalistic strategies.
Many business associations regard close relations with EU officials and
parliamentarians as important assets and seek to get accepted as legitimate
spokespeople for their domains (Wilson, 1973: 314–16). Their insider strategy
matches the need of the EU institutions for policy information and support.
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Hypothesis 4.1: An insider strategy increases the number of interactions with EU
institutions.
Other associations resort to the media and to the public in order to repre-
sent their interests. Occasionally, well-timed public pressure may improve
their access and influence. However, frequent campaigns against EU decisions
seem incompatible with an insider strategy. It is therefore not likely that
business associations will resort to an outsider strategy if they attach great
value to close relationships with state institutions (Wilson, 1973: 285).
Arguably, the effects of a campaign depend on whether it is run by EU
associations or by national groups. Because the European public is structured
along national borders, national groups tend to mobilize distinct national
publics. Their efforts are directed at national institutions even if they result
from EU policies (Imig and Tarrow, 2001). In contrast, EU associations seek
to mobilize a wider ‘European public’ or audiences from several member
states, which should have a more favourable effect on their access to the EU
institutions.
Hypothesis 4.2: An outsider strategy reduces the number of contacts with EU
institutions. EU associations pursuing an outsider strategy have better access than
do national associations with such a strategy.
Finally, some associations thrive on the heterogeneity of the EU member
states. To them, the nationality of EU officials and politicians as well as their
language is of utmost importance in selecting contact partners. To a lesser
extent, they select their contact partners on the basis of party affiliation and
on the basis of personal acquaintance. This nationalistic strategy limits the
number of contact partners in the EU because it relies on coalition-building
with like-minded national actors and is rooted in deeply ingrained national
differences among EU politicians and officials that are not conducive to EU
problem-solving.
Hypothesis 4.3: A nationalistic strategy reduces access to EU institutions.
Table 1 summarizes these hypotheses and presents the operational defi-
nitions of the variables.3
The empirical analysis
Research design and data
These hypotheses will be tested in a study that combines Lijphart’s com-
parable cases research strategy (1975) with statistical methods. Important
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context variables are controlled by focusing on a particular category of col-
lective actors in EU member states with several common features. The cross-
sectional analysis is based on a survey conducted between June 1998 and
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Table 1 Summary of hypotheses and operational definitions of variables
H Variable Effect Operational definition
Institutional opportunity structure
1.1 Task level: EU association + 0 (French associations), 1 EU associations
1.2 Corporatism + 0 (French associations), 1 German associations
Pluralism + 0 (French associations), 1 UK associations
Resource dependencies
2.1 Relevance of EU  + Relevance of EU institution (Commission, EP or 
institution EU Council) for interest representation from 1
(not important at all) to 6 (very important)
2.2 Policy information + Scale of providing political, legal, technical or
economic policy information: 1 never; 2
sometimes; 3 often
2.3 Internationalization + Foreign turnover as percentage of total turnover 
2.4 Economic weight + Employees of member firms in 1000
2.5 Membership density + Percentage of potential members organized by
the association
Organization
3.1 Sector domain + 1 sub-sector; 2 sector; 3 cross-sector
3.2 Federation + 0 (other members); 1 members: associations
Mixed membership + 0 (other members); 1 members: firms and
associations
3.3 Budget + Revenue of the association in €10,000
3.4 Interest representation + Percentage of revenues spent on interest
representation
Strategic choice
4.1 Insider strategy + Factor scores for the importance of personal
contacts, position papers, administrative
responsibilities
4.2 Outsider strategy – Factor scores for the importance of media,
public mobilization, presence in committees
EU outsider strategy + EU associations: factor scores for the
importance of media, public mobilization,
presence in committees
4.3 Nationalistic strategy – Factor scores for the importance of nationality,
language, party affiliation
Note: All variables are based on the questionnaire that was sent to the associations. Hence, the
data in this article are based on the information and the assessments of the respondents.
March 1999.4 The survey focused on two classes of actors. It addressed 1998
German, French, UK and EU business associations and asked them to specify
their patterns of interest intermediation. In addition, 68 large firms in these
countries were questioned. The firms are excluded from this analysis.5
Focusing on producer and employer associations means that a significant
portion of the interest organizations active at the EU level are covered: about
80% of the EU associations are business interest associations (see European
Commission, 2002b).
Owing to its large size and broad sectoral coverage,6 the analysis should
give a good indication of the cumulative responses of business interests to
European integration after almost 50 years of the integration process. But note
that no time-series data are available (yet) on this topic and that only a few
questions in the questionnaire cover the longitudinal comparison. Overall,
834 responses were received (see Table 2). Excluding international associ-
ations, the rate of return was 40.9%, and the return rates for the different sub-
groups ranged from 32.3% in the case of the French associations to 50.0% in
the case of large firms. Although providing a reasonable rate of return on
which inferences can be based, the sample might disproportionately cover
those organizations that are affected by EU regulation and have the capacity
to deal with the EU institutions. I did not correct this by statistical weights
because the structure of the European business interest group population is
not well known.7
The focus on the large member states makes for variations among the
domestic patterns of interest intermediation. Hence, it is reasonable to expect
significant cross-national variation (see Hypothesis 1.2). At the same time, the
choice of countries holds important background conditions fairly constant:
these are the country size, the level of economic and technological develop-
ment, the relevance of these countries in EU decision-making, their formal
decision-making rights, and their long duration of EU membership. There-
fore, the findings presented here cannot be easily translated into the contexts
of the worse-off member states (Portugal, Spain and Greece) whose economic
structures diverge somewhat, or into the contexts of those member states that
joined the EU in 1995 (Sweden, Finland and Austria) because only then were
these exposed to the full influence of the EU. Obviously, this holds all the
more for the new member states of the Eastern enlargement.
The regression analysis
I analyse the impact of these factors by means of ordered logit regressions
because access to the EU institutions was measured in six categories on an
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ordinal scale: no, annual, half yearly, quarterly, monthly, and weekly contacts.
Table 3 describes the access of the business associations to the EU institutions.
As discussed, the groups maintain more contacts with the Commission than
with the Parliament, and slightly more contacts with the EP than with the EU
Council. They are more frequently in touch with the working levels of the
Commission and the Council than with the political leadership of these insti-
tutions. However, their access to the members and committees of the
European Parliament is fairly similar. Hence, the vertical structures of the
Commission and the Council account for several differences in the access
patterns, whereas the horizontal division of labour between committee and
plenary work in the Parliament does not cause much variation.
The bottom panel of Table 4 presents the summary statistics of the
maximum likelihood estimations.8 The overall fit of the models can be gauged
from the G2 likelihood ratio tests, which are all statistically significant 
(p < .001). According to McKelvey and Zavoina’s R2, the models explain
between 46% (Council of Ministers) and 59% (Commission working level) of
the variance if the ordinal data were transformed into an underlying interval
scale. They predict between 46% (Commission working level) and 70%
(Council of Ministers) of the cases correctly.
The top panel in Table 4 presents the regression results. Missing values
were estimated by multiple imputation (Honacker et al., 2001; King et al., 2001)
because a significant number of cases would have been lost using listwise
deletion. Raw coefficients are ordered logit coefficients. The significance levels
are based on two-tailed tests. Beyond their direction and significance, these
coefficients are hard to interpret because the impact of a change in the value
of an independent variable on the contact probabilities depends upon the
values of all other independent variables. To facilitate their substantive
interpretation, I discuss the outcomes for sector federations, with all other
variables kept at their means or moved from their minima to their maxima.
Figure 1 displays their contact probabilities with the political leaders and desk
officers in the Commission and the Council of Ministers and with the
members of the European Parliament, separately for EU groups and national
associations, with all other independent variables kept at their means. Table 5
indicates the impact of moving an independent variable from its minimum
to its maximum on the probability of having weekly contacts with these EU
institutions,9 thus demonstrating its substantial effect. Contrasting EU associ-
ations with German groups, Figure 2 illustrates the effects of financial
resources, institutional relevance and policy information on the contact
probabilities with the EU bureaucracy when moved from their minima to
their maxima. The vertical lines indicate the means of the variables.
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(a) EU associations
Figure 2 Contact probabilities with European Commission working level,
conditional upon budget, relevance and policy information.
Notes: The figures denote the changes in the contact probabilities for sector federations when the
independent variable is moved from its minimum to its maximum, with all other variables kept at
their means. Vertical x-lines denote the means of the three variables.
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Figure 2 Continued
The empirical results: Access and explanations
The empirical results confirm that the institutional context, resource depen-
dencies, organizational structures and strategic choices must be taken into
account when analysing the access of business interest organizations to the
EU institutions. It is insufficient to focus on just one of these dimensions.
Because the EU institutional context is highly segmented, EU interest inter-
mediation is highly variegated. Only a few factors have a consistent impact
on access patterns, namely the position of associations in the EU multi-level
setting, the organizational resources they control and their perception of insti-
tutional regulation. The effects of all other factors are contingent upon the
characteristics of the EU institutions.
The institutional context
Their location in the EU multi-level system has a significant impact on the
contacts of interest organizations with the EU institutions. EU associations tend
to have better access than national groups, which supports Hypothesis 1.1.
According to Figure 1, this difference is most pronounced at the working level
of the Commission and less obvious at the level of its political leaders and in
the EP. The probability of EU associations maintaining weekly contacts with
EU bureaucrats amounts to .18. While suggesting that only about one-fifth of
EU groups tend to be in touch with the Commission very often, this figure is
six times higher than that of French groups and three and a half times higher
than that of German groups. The probability of EU groups maintaining
weekly contacts with MEPs is rather low. It amounts to .03, which is still two
to three times higher than that of the national groups (see the base prob-
abilities in Table 5). In contrast to previous studies (Bouwen, 2002: 17, 24)
claiming that national associations are as frequently in touch as EU-level
groups with the Parliament, these figures illustrate that EU associations have
become major interlocuters of both the Commission and the Parliament,
whereas, on average, national associations are only occasionally in touch with
these institutions. However, the EU groups find it as difficult as national
associations to approach the Council because Council members represent
national interests to a greater extent than do the other EU institutions. They
also lack the additional national avenue to Council members that is open to
national associations.
The multi-level structure of the institutional setting has a more profound
impact than the domestic modes of interest intermediation. In fact, there is
no clear-cut relation between these modes and the contact patterns at EU
level. Figure 1 illustrates rather small and complex differences between the
national groups: UK pluralism supports slightly better access than French
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statism to the EU Council and to the EP but not to the Commission. Cor-
poratist practices enable German associations to establish more contacts with
the Commission bureaucracy than the French associations but not with the
other institutions. These findings are inconsistent with the expectation
(Hypothesis 1.2) that there is a clear rank order between corporatist, plural-
ist and statist groups when it comes to representing interests at EU level. Nor
do these findings support the proposition that the degree of fit determines
the access of domestic interest groups.
Therefore, the rival hypothesis about the impact of the embeddedness of
domestic actors in national policy networks needs to be scrutinized. A closer
inspection (appendix Table A2)10 yields moderate to strong correlations
between the domestic and the EU-level contacts of national interest groups.
Accordingly, it can be ruled out that weak embeddedness in national politics
provides the grounds for close relations with the EU institutions. On the
contrary, domestic embeddedness tends to reinforce access at the EU level.
This correlation is strongest among the German groups, which translate the
corporatist division of labour between peak associations and other interest
groups to the EU level. In pluralist and statist regimes, in contrast, the
domestic division of labour is under greater pressure. 
Thus, the modes of interest intermediation do not result in consistent
access patterns at EU level. However, they condition the impact of the EU on
the division of labor and the mode of competition in the domestic interest
group systems. Finally, when analysing the predicted access patterns by
country, the French and particularly the UK organizations appear to incor-
porate the European Parliament to a greater extent into their lobbying
strategies than do the German associations. These concentrate their efforts 
on the EU bureaucracy, apparently transferring their domestic focus on
administrative interest intermediation to the EU level (Dyson, 1980;
Lehmbruch, 1991).
However, when disaggregating the empirical contact patterns by country
(not reported), German associations maintain slightly more contacts than UK
or French groups with the Commission and have as many contacts as UK
associations with the EU Council and the EP. According to the regression
results, UK associations would be expected to have better access to these
institutions, apart from the EU bureaucracy. Here, the exchange goods, the
organizational resources and the strategies of the interest groups come into
play, outweighing the effects of the modes of interest intermediation. German
associations tend to have broader domains and more resources than UK
organizations, specialize more in interest representation, and are more likely
to pursue insider strategies. They control more policy information and find
the EU institutions to be more important for the representation of their
interests. All together, these factors outweigh the domestic modes of interest
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intermediation, which therefore seem to be less relevant to the explanation
than organizational structures, resources and strategies. Research on large
firms corroborates the inconsistent impact of these modes on EU lobbying
(Bernhagen and Mitchell, 2007).
Resource dependencies
Resource dependencies are crucial to the explanation of access patterns. The
relevance that associations ascribe to the EU institutions because of their
political activities has a profound impact on the contact frequencies, as was
expected in Hypothesis 2.1. In fact, national associations are not likely to seek
access if an EU institution seems irrelevant to the representation of their
interests. For example, in that case, the likelihood of German associations 
not maintaining contacts with the Commission amounts to a striking 75%
(Figure 2). If they find the EU bureaucrats highly relevant to their cause, the
German groups are most likely to have quarterly access to them.
The perception of the EU institutions also shapes the activities of the 
EU-level groups. Their probability of maintaining weekly contacts with EU
bureaucrats increases by 38 percentage points if they attach great rather than
little importance to the EU officials for the representation of their interests
(Table 5). Even though the likelihood that associations maintain as many
contacts with MEPs is well below these levels, the Parliament appears also to
be quite open to major stakeholders in EU policies. Perceiving the Parliament
as a very important institution tends to enhance the probability of having
weekly contacts with it more than any other factor does (see Table 5).
Furthermore, the exchange goods that interest organizations control are
of major importance. As expected, the ability to provide policy information
improves their access, corroborating that this capacity is important in EU
politics (Hypothesis 2.2). The probability of EU groups having weekly
contacts with EU bureaucrats increases by .23 and that of German groups is
raised by .07 if they command a maximum rather than a minimum of policy
information (Table 5). However, compared with the importance that interest
groups ascribe to the EU institutions, their capacity to provide policy infor-
mation has a more moderate effect on access patterns (see Figure 2). More
generally, policy information does not seem to be as important for obtaining
access as has been suggested in earlier studies (Bouwen, 2002). However, this
finding does not rule out that policy information may be crucial when it comes
to securing policy outcomes.
In support of Hypothesis 2.4, greater economic weight increases contact
frequency. The EU institutions cannot ignore the employment effects of
European policies and they include groups that have economic clout more
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frequently in their political consultations. However, the number of
employees in the member firms that an association represents appears to be
less relevant to the explanation of the contact patterns than the importance
that groups ascribe to the EU institutions and their ability to provide policy
information. The probability of EU groups having weekly contacts with the
EU bureaucracy increases by .14 and that of national groups is raised by .03
to .05 if their members have 1.5 million employees rather than none.
The remaining two exchange goods vary in their effects across the EU
institutions. As expected (Hypothesis 2.3), internationalization enables interest
organizations to establish more contacts with the EU Council and the
Commission. The likelihood of EU groups maintaining weekly contacts with
EU bureaucrats increases by almost 30 percentage points if the firms they
represent are highly internationalized (Table 5) and not confined to a national
market. However, internationalization does not support significantly better
access to the Parliament. Depending on the support of their constituencies, the
MEPs pay as much attention to domestic business as to multinational enter-
prises. In conclusion, the Parliament should prove to be more responsive to
protectionist demands than the Council or the Commission.
Finally, greater membership density does not have a significant impact on
the number of contacts with the Commission and the Council. In stark contrast
to Hypothesis 2.5, it even reduces the odds of having contacts with the EP.
There are two reasons why there appears to be no real pull from the EU insti-
tutions to consult business associations that seem more representative of their
domains. First, except for the social partners, the EU institutions have not yet
developed clear standards as to what determines the representative character
of an association. Hence, they might not be aware of the membership density
of associations. Second, other exchange goods seem to be of greater import-
ance to the EU institutions when it comes to consulting business associations:
they tend to consult groups that represent European rather than national
interests, are stakeholders in EU regulation and can provide policy information
or have economic clout.
Interest group organization
Among the organizational factors, the financial resources of interest organiz-
ations are of major importance. The probability of EU associations that are in
command of considerable financial resources (i.e. a budget of 7.5 million)
having weekly contacts with the Commission is 46 percentage points higher
than that of have-nots (Table 5 and Figure 2), which supports Hypothesis 3.3.
The corresponding increases for national associations range from 13 percent-
age points (French groups) to 21 percentage points (German groups). Of all
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factors, then, the financial endowment of groups has the greatest potential to
leave an imprint on contacts with the Commission, and when it comes to
accessing the Council and the Parliament it ranks second only to the import-
ance that associations ascribe to these institutions. However, associations that
want to ‘buy’ more contacts with the EU institutions need to invest heavily
in their lobbying activities: increasing the associational budget from the
overall mean of 1.59 million by 250,000 raises the probability of EU associ-
ations having weekly contacts with the Commission by just 1 percentage point
and that of national groups by 0.2 to 0.5 percentage points (see Table 5 or
Figure 2).
Specializing in interest representation also pays off, improving the ability
of groups to address the relevant contact partners and to deliver the requested
exchange goods (Hypothesis 3.4). But the extent to which groups concentrate
on the representation of interests is less consequential than the material
resources at their disposal. The probability of EU groups having weekly
contacts with the Commission bureaucracy is raised by 9 percentage points
when fully concentrating on interest representation rather than on the
coordination of markets or the provision of services.
The sector domain and the position of associations in the associational
systems have ambiguous effects, reflecting both institutional variations and
the contradictory logics built into these factors: associations with broader
sector domains tend to have slightly better access to the Council than 
groups with narrower domains (Table 4). The national ministers prefer to
listen to broad-based interest groups that are affected by a large number of
EU policy issues and represent a broad membership. However, in contrast to
Hypothesis 3.1, these organizations are not more frequently in touch with the
other EU institutions. Evidently, the policy experts in the Commission and
the Parliament depend as much on the input of more specialized associations,
which also suffer less from collective action problems.
Being located at the higher echelons of the associational population,
federations are more frequently in touch with the Commission and with
Coreper than are groups with a direct membership. But this does not hold
for groups with a mixed membership, which invalidates Hypothesis 3.2. The
European Parliament, which might be expected to support broad-based
political representation throughout the Union, rewards neither greater
domain size nor a peak association function. In sum, the Council machinery
has a preference for dealing with associations that are located at the peak of
their domain or have a broad-based domain, whereas the Commission privi-
leges peak associations. None of these associational properties is of relevance
to the MEPs.
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The strategic choices of interest organizations
Finally, the strategies that interest organizations pursue matter, even though
a few caveats are in order. First, nationalistic strategies have no significant
effects, thus invalidating Hypothesis 4.3. Second, the impact of insider and
outsider strategies is contingent upon the institutional context, which is
contrary to Hypotheses 4.1 and 4.2: they affect neither the number of contacts
with the Council and its administration nor those with the Commission
leaders. Nonetheless, these strategies have a significant bearing on access to
policy experts in the Commission and in the Parliament.
As expected, an insider strategy improves access to both parliamen-
tarians and bureaucrats. It has a profound impact on the number of contacts
that interest groups maintain with the EU bureaucracy. Relying greatly on an
insider strategy rather than not relying on insider tactics increases the prob-
ability of EU groups maintaining weekly contacts with EU bureaucrats by .34
and that of national groups by .07 (French associations) to .12 (German
groups) (see Table 5). Hence, the insider strategy proves to be a highly efficient
means of communicating policy information to the bureaucratic staff when
policy proposals are being drafted. It is of less relevance when the organiz-
ations seek to approach the Parliament on a regular basis, but even here it is
still more effective than an outsider strategy.
The impact of the outsider strategy varies, which highlights important
institutional differences. Under public scrutiny, the members of the European
Parliament are attentive to media coverage and public debates. That is why
national associations that pursue an outsider strategy do not have fewer
contacts with the MEPs and why EU associations employing outsider tactics
across national borders have even more contacts with them. This suggests
that national groups use outsider strategies mainly in order to draw public
or governmental attention to EU policies. They rely on the mobilization of
domestic publics and politicians as well as on the activities of EU-level groups
but do not necessarily seek redress through the European Parliament. In
contrast, EU associations tend to combine outsider strategies with a greater
presence in parliamentary consultations. The bureaucratic rationality of the
Commission staff clearly diverges from the Parliament’s response to EU
media coverage. Pursuing an outsider strategy tends to reduce access to the
bureaucratic staff. On the one hand, groups pursuing outsider tactics use it
to compensate for a lack of access to the EU bureaucracy; on the other hand,
these tactics also interfere with the logic of the insider strategy. Hence, it seems
possible to combine insider and outsider strategies vis-à-vis the Parliament
but not vis-à-vis the Commission. This might place interest groups in a
dilemma because it seems difficult to limit the effects of outsider strategies to
specific institutions in a political system.
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Conclusion
EU political exchanges are shaped by institutional context and resource
dependencies as well as by the organizational structures and strategic choices
of interest groups. It would be remiss to exclude either of these dimensions
from the study of interest group access in the EU. Studies focusing on just
one of these dimensions tend to overrate its importance. Nonetheless, the
analysis confirms that it is difficult to identify general patterns of interest
intermediation in the EU because the impact of many factors is conditioned
by the segmented EU institutional context.
Several findings about the general determinants of EU interest inter-
mediation consolidate the results of previous studies. To some extent, they
modify our conventional wisdom and also establish the relative importance
of these factors. First, EU regulation is a major incentive for associations to
intensify their lobbying efforts and to get in touch more frequently with the
EU institutions. It is indeed necessary for national associations to locate the
EU institutions important for the representation of their interests if they are
to establish contacts with them. The Commission and the Parliament prove
to be quite open to those interest groups that are affected by EU regulation
and that consider them to be important.
Secondly, in the EU multi-level setting, EU and national associations act
primarily at their main level of operation and have developed a division of
labour that extends to different phases of the policy cycle: EU associations
concentrate their activities on its early stages, whereas national groups tend
to follow the process from the formulation of EU policies until their imple-
mentation in the member states. All in all, EU associations have evolved into
routine interlocuters of the EU institutions when EU policies are being drafted.
To say the least, they have turned into important negotiation arenas, and in
some cases even into actors in their own right. By contrast, only a minority of
national associations act routinely at the EU level. Because these actors are
usually also well embedded in domestic policy networks, they are vital to the
representation of business interests in the EU multi-level system (Eising, 2004).
Thirdly, resources are crucial to the representation of interests in EU
politics. Well-endowed associations have much better access than poor associ-
ations, underscoring that EU lobbying needs substantial material backing.
The ability to provide policy information also improves the standing of
interest groups even though it appears to be less important for obtaining
access than has been suggested in previous studies (Bouwen, 2002). Moreover,
EU state–group relations are clearly not confined to the exchange of policy
information. Economic clout and internationalization have also proven to be
of some importance because the EU institutions must take the economic
effects of EU policies into account.
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In sum, those organizations that find the EU institutions important to the
representation of their interests, command sufficient financial resources, can
bring in policy information and have economic clout tend to have better
access than other groups, which gives them a greater chance to have a say in
EU policies. The significance of political exchange goods and material
resources in EU politics raises genuine doubts that the current efforts of the
EU institutions at strengthening civil society participation and working
towards more equitable consultation patterns (see European Commission,
2002a) will significantly reduce the bias that exists in favour of resourceful
actors. For this to happen, not only would the EU institutions need to pay a
substantially higher premium on interest groups’ other exchange goods, such
as their potential contribution to policy legitimacy and public support for the
EU. Civil society organizations would also need to be able to follow EU policy
issues across the policy cycle and table detailed policy information that is
backed by large constituencies.
In that respect, it is important to note that, among the EU institutions,
only the European Parliament is attentive to outsider strategies enhancing the
public debate. The political rationality of the MEPs, who are subject to
national election pressures, clearly differs from the bureaucratic rationality of
the Commission, which encourages an insider strategy and punishes an
outsider strategy in its attempt to devise innovative and workable policy
proposals. It appears that the Parliament is a more promising venue for civil
society concerns and protectionist demands than the Council or the
Commission, even though it is important to bear in mind that it still has
limited legislative powers (see also Kohler-Koch, 1997). As a consequence,
national groups use outsider tactics mainly to draw public or governmental
attention to their causes and rarely seek redress through the Parliament. EU
associations, in contrast, tend to combine such tactics with a greater presence
in parliamentary consultations.
Finally, the relationship between national modes of interest inter-
mediation and EU access patterns is less pronounced than was posited in
earlier studies (Cowles, 2001; Schmidt, 1999). The differences among statist,
pluralistic and corporatist groups were both smaller and more complex than
expected. There are several explanations for the resulting ambiguity. First,
factors other than these national modes may be more important in EU politics.
In part, organizational structures, strategies and exchange goods outweigh
their impact. Second, the domestic modes may be less different than is often
claimed. It is likely that, after 50 years, European integration has levelled out
some differences. Moreover, these modes are rarely found in their pure form,
rather often being blurred. Finally, the modal studies have not paid much
attention to institutional differentiation, which is of great importance in this
study.
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Given these results and the limitation of this study to the analysis of
business interests from three large EU member states, three major research
desiderata emerge. First, it would be useful to subject other types of interest
organizations, a broad variety of policy issues and a greater number of EU
member states to quantitative analyses in order to place our understandings
of EU interest intermediation on a more robust empirical basis (see the contri-
butions in Coen, 2007). Second, in conjunction with the importance of multi-
level policy networks, the segmentation of the EU institutional setting calls
for systematic comparisons of these structures in different issue areas. Such
analyses should explicitly address those theoretical and empirical gaps that
can best be tackled in configurative analyses. Finally, the focus of EU interest
group studies needs to be broadened to incorporate the study of social move-
ments, political cleavages and political parties, which are all part of the politi-
cal space in which interest groups are situated. This might help place political
scientists in a position to come to terms with major aspects of the cleavage
structure and the democratic quality of the European polity.
Notes
The paper draws on survey research conducted at the Mannheim Centre for
European Social Research with Christine Quittkat and directed by Beate Kohler-
Koch. I am grateful for the financial support provided by the European Centre
for Public Affairs and the University of Mannheim, as well as for the chance to
conceive the initial parts of this study at the European University Institute. Earlier
versions of the paper were helpfully discussed at the European Union Studies
Associations Conference in Austin, at the European Consortium for Political
Research General Conference in Budapest, at the FernUniversität in Hagen, in the
ARENA seminar series in Oslo, and at the Economic and Social Research Council
workshop on ‘Organized Interests and Democratic Governance’ in Newcastle. In
particular, I would like to thank Nathalie Behnke, Arthur Benz, Jan Beyers, David
Coen, Maria Green Cowles, Andrea Lenschow, David Lowery, Susanne Lütz, Gary
Marks, Johan P. Olsen, Vivien Schmidt, Gerald Schneider, Ulf Sverdrup, Tony Zito
and three anonymous referees for their insightful suggestions.
1 The situation is similar in US interest group studies (see Baumgartner and
Leech, 1998).
2 EURELECTRIC, the peak association of the EU electricity industry,
complained that it was temporarily shut out from EU decision-making when
the European Commission drafted its proposals for the liberalization of the
sector.
3 Corporatism is measured by a dummy variable for German associations, and
pluralism is measured by a dummy variable for UK associations. French
associations are the reference category. As a result, French groups are also the
reference category for the effect of the task level, which compares EU associ-
ations with national associations. To assess the difference between EU and
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national associations, I take the sizes of the regression coefficients in the
subsequent analysis into account.
The policy information scale is based on three variables that indicate how
often (never, sometimes, often) associations are asked to provide legal,
economic or political information to political institutions (Cronbach’s 
alpha: .68).
The three strategy factors were extracted from 11 variables by means of a
principal components analysis. These variables indicate either the importance
of different criteria for selecting contact partners (nationality, language,
administrative responsibility, party membership) on a scale from 1 (not at all
important) to 6 (very important) or the usefulness of different ways of repre-
senting interests (position papers, personal contacts, regular contacts and
background information, targeted contacts and information, presence in
committees and hearings, scientific expertise, mobilization of public and
media) at EU level. The three factors cover 62% of the total variance. ‘Insider
strategy’ has an Eigenvalue of 4.0 and extracts 36% of the variance, ‘nation-
alistic strategy’ has an Eigenvalue of 1.7 and extracts 16%, and ‘outsider
strategy’ has an Eigenvalue of 1.0 and extracts 9%. Since these strategies need
not be mutually exclusive, an oblique rotation was performed. ‘Insider
strategy’ loads highly on administrative responsibilities and personal
contacts and moderately on committee presence and scientific expertise.
‘Nationalism’ loads highly on nationality and language and to a lesser extent
on party membership. ‘Outsider strategy’ loads highly on committee
presence, scientific expertise and mobilization of media and public; it is
moderately correlated with ‘insider strategy’ (Pearson’s r: .40).
4 The sample is based on the following sources: Oeckl (1997), Conseil National
du Patronat Francais (1997), Henderson and Henderson (1995), European
Commission (1996).
5 I compare the access of business associations and large firms elsewhere
(Eising, 2007).
6 Economic branches from agriculture, industry and services are included. The
largest branch is trade, with a share of 13.8% of all associations.
7 As a consequence, the data might underrate the empirical variance within
the interest group population, and the subsequent regression analysis might,
to some extent, underplay those factors that bear significantly on the access
patterns.
8 I used SPost (Long and Freese, 2001) to calculate these measures and the
resulting probabilities.
9 Table A1 (in the appendix) provides the descriptive statistics of these
variables.
10 The appendix is available at http://www.uni-konstanz.de/eup/issues.htm.
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